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MARRIAGE AS PART PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS*
The English Statute of Frauds (1677) provides that no
action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any
agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one
year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or
note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. The statute further states, with reference to
marriage, that no action shall be brought whereby to charge
any person on any agreement made in consideration of marriage, unless the agreement or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized.'
This general rule, that contracts made in consideration of
marriage must be in some form of writing and signed by the
parties, has been followed, in a general way, by the courts since
the passage of the statute. However, there are some exceptions
and limitations to this general rule, that need some explanation.
It is the purpose of this note to deal with this phase of the subject, part performance as related to contracts in consideration
of marriage.
PROMIsEs TO IARY

In order to clear the subject of some apparently allied matters, let us give some consideration to promises to marry. As
an historical development this subject is most interesting. In
the earliest case that came up under the fourth section of the
statute of frauds,2 where the question of a promise to marry
*This is the second of a series of studies on the Statute of Frauds,
the first appearing in the January issue.
I The Statute of 13 Eliz. relating to fraudulent sales and conveyances is frequently referred to as "the statute of frauds," but this is
inaccurate. The English Statute of Frauds, properly speaking, is Statute 29, Car. II, c. 3, Sec. 4 (1677), with its amendments relating to
the evidence necessary to establish certain contracts and causes of action (Statement in 25 R. C. L. 433).
'Philpot v. Walcot, 24 Skinner, 90 Eng. Rep. 13 (1681); Philpot v.
Wallet, 24 Skinner, 89 Eng. Rep. 405 (1681).
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was considered, the court held that a promise to marry came
within the statute, being"'as much a catching promise as any
that the act intended to prevent." This holding was in these
words: "Action sur case where the defendant promised the
plaintiff marriage; the jury find the promise, but that (even
tho) it was not in writing." However, this is contra to the great
weight of authority, and, on the part of the court, was not unanimous, as a dissenting opinion held that the promise was for
marriage itself, and not made in consideration of marriage, and
was, therefore, outside the purview of the statute.
But right away, after this decision, we find the English
courts breaking away from this interpretation of the statute,
and following the dissenting opinion to the effect that promises
to marry have no connection with the statute of frauds. Oral
promises to marry were held not to come within the statute and
were placed on the basis of ordinary contracts. As an illustration of this view of the courts, where the promise of the man
was proved, and no actual promise of the woman, evidence of
her carrying herself as consenting and approving his promise,
was held sufficient. In the language of the court: "There is
no necessity of proving an actual promise on the woman's part,
for it is sufficient evidence to show that she countenanced the
promise, and carried herself so as one who approved and consented to it." 3 There is no mention of the statute of frauds
here, or that the statute has anything to do with the case.
If an infant and a person of legal age mutually promised
to marry, the infant, altho not bound (placing the agreement
on the basis of an ordinary contract), may bring an action for
4
breach of the contract by the adult.
In some cases it was held that mutual promises to marry
were not by the statute of frauds necessary to be in writing.5
In Cork v. Baker, infra, the language of the court follows: "It
was held that this (the promise to marry) is not within the
statute of frauds and perjuries, which relates only to contracts
in consideration of marriage."
These decisions clearly take
4I Hutton

v. Mansell, 3 Salk. 16, 90 Eng. Rep. 1152.
Holt v. Ward, 2 Str. 938, 93 Eng. Rep. 954. Trinity Term, 5 and 6,
Geo. 2.
'Harrison v. Cage, 1 Ld. Raym. 387, 91 Eng. Rep. 156, 10 Will 3
(1338); Cork v. Baker, 1 Str. 34, 93 Eng. Rep, 367. Hillary Term, 3 Geo.
(1795).
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promises to marry out of the statute of frauds, or rather decide
they never came within the statute.
However, we find, under some statutory regulations in the
United States, that agreements to marry, on the face of them
or by their provisions, which show they were to be performed at
the end of a longer time than a year, come -within the statute. 6
In many cases it is shown to be doubtful as to whether these
promises to marry ever came within the statute of frauds. The
evidence is generally based upon circumstantial proof. 7 As a
general rule, where it is not shown definitely that the promise
to marry was at the end of a period longer than a year, it will
be presumed to have been meant to be performed within a year.
There are cases holding that the statement in the statute,
requiring all agreements not to be performed within a year to
be in writing, applies to promises to marry.8 A New Hampshire
case 9 holds that a contract to marry at the end of five years
is within the statute of frauds, and should be in writing.
In a Kentucky -case,'0 it has been held that promises to
marry are not within the statute of frauds and need not be in
writing. In a Maryland case,:" where the parties had agreed
to marry at the end of three years, the court held the promise
could not be put on the same basis as an ordinary contract for
the sale of goods or the performance of labor, and that it did
not come within the statute of frauds. Many other cases hold
that a promise to marry is not a promise in consideration of
2
marriage, so as to require it to be in writing.'
In concluding the statement on this phase of the subject,
it is safe to say that, as a general rule, mutual promises of marriage were not regarded, and are not regarded, as coming within
the statute.'2 Some statutes expressly exclude from their op0

Ullman v. Meyer, 10 Fed. 241 (1882).
'Perkins v. Hersey, 1 R. I. 493 (1851); Honan v. Earle, 53 N. Y.
267 (1873).
Ullman v. Meyer, 10 Fed. 241 (1882).
9
Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515 (1822).
10Withers v. Richardson, 21 Ky. 94 (1827).
"Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md. 294 (1900).
1Clarkc v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495 (1850) ; Short v. gtotts, 58 Ind.
29 (1877); Morgan v. Yarbrough, 23 La. Rep. 272 (1850); Ogden v.
Ogden, 1 Bland 284 (Md.), 1818; Hoitt v. Moulton, 21 N. H. 586 (1850).
"Note: 63 Am. Dec. 533, in a discusion of Burnham v. Cornwell,
55 Ky. 284 (1855).
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eration mutual promises of marriage. 14 However, the contrary
view is taken in a good many cases. The general rule has been
well expressed in a Kentucky case:15 "A. promise to marry is
not a promise 'in consideration of marriage,' so as to require
it to be evidenced by writing under the statute of frauds."
CASES W -E E

ARRIAGE ALONE IS SUFFICIENT

By ,some courts in England and in this country marriage
itself is considered such a part performance of an oral contract
in consideration of marriage as will take the contract out of
the statute of frauds. Some of these courts have gone so far as
to say that marriage is the highest consideration known to the
law, 16 and that, where marriage has been performed in consideration of the agreement, being fully performed by the marriage on the one side, the agreement should be specifically enforced by the court. Lord Coke said: 17 "If a man had given
land to a man with his daughter in frank marriage generally, a
fee simple had passed without this word 'heirs;' for there is
no consideration so much respected in law as the consideration
of marriage, in respect of alliance and posterity." But a departure came with reference to this rule of the English interpretation of part performance under the statute. Chancellor
Malins said of this departure in delivering his opinion in a
certain case :1
"I must say in-this case, as I have said on similar occasions before, that the decisions are to be regretted which
have uniformly held that marriage is not part performance,
so as to take parol contracts out of the statute."
The views of these men are not generally accepted nowadays
in those of our states where the statute of frauds applies. By
the weight of authority marriage itself is not sufficient consideration for the enforcement of oral agreements in consideration of
marriage.' 9 But we find a strong minority opinion, and the
cases that follow will show something of the strength of this
opinion.
4

Hunt v. Hunt, 171 N. Y. 396 (1902).
2WWithers v. Richardson, 21 Ky. 94 (1827).
"'1 Bay (S. 0.) 232 (1792).
"Co. Litt. 8b.
13Ungley v. tUhjgley, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 73 (1876).
"Rowell v. Barber, 142 Wis. 304 (1910).
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In an early Maryland case, 20 it was held that an agreement
by a father with his daughter, in contemplation of her marriage, by way of advancement, and as a marriage endowment,
followed by her marriage as then contemplated, has for its support a valuable consideration. It cannot be revoked by the
father. The marriage is a consideration which vests the interest
in the donee against all the world. The daughter is regarded as
a purchaser, as much so, as if she had paid for the property
an adequate pecuniary consideration.
In Irish Chancery 21 it was held "no acceptance could be
more solemn that the fact of marrying the lady." Where marriage follows upon the agreement, a distinct and positive dissent from the proposition of settlement would be required to be
shown, in order to avert a decree of specific execution according
22
to its terms.
In another case 23 the promise was made by the father to
the daughter to settle a portion upon her in consideration of
her marriage. The future husband knew hothing of this, but
after the marriage the husband sued her father for the portion.
Held that the husband did not marry in consideration of the
promise, knowing nothing of it. There is a reference in the
letter of the father which would indicate a previous oral promise
to both of them, and the case, for this reason, should have been
decided the other way. The letter only confirmed the oral
23
promise.
In a South Carolina case, 25 where the English statute has
been literally re-enacted, it has been said in chancery that an
antenuptial oral agreement founded on the consideration of
marriage, though resting in parol merely, provided it be satisfactorily established by proof, would be set up and enforced.
In a Maryland case 26 it w4s held that, in order for an antenuptial promise to prevail against the statute of frauds, the
proof of the agreement between the parties must be clear and
(1845).
2Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill. 138, Md.
21Greene v. Cramer, 2 Con. & Law 54; Saunders v. Cramer, 3 Dru.
& War 87.
L2Lders v. Anstey, 4 Ves. Jr. 501, 21 Eng. Rep. 257 (1799).
'Ayliffe v. Tracey, 2 P. Williams 65, 88 Eng. Rep. 276 (1722).
.Hatcherv. Robertson, 4 Strobh Eq. 179 (1850).
'Stoddert v. Tuck, 4 Md. Ch. 475 (1851).
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positive.

We find other Maryland cases lining up with this

view 27.
CASES REQUIRING ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE

By the weight of authority, where the promise contained in
an oral antenuptial agreement is made in expectation or contemplation of the marriage, and there is a consideration for the
contract other than the marriage of the parties, the promise is not
within the purview of the statute of frauds relative to contracts
made in consideration of marriage. 28 In other words, marriage
itself is not part performance, but marriage in connection with
other acts may be. Chancellor Malins said:29 "I should say,
therefore, that if A. is about to marry, and proves a promise
on behalf of the intended wife's father that he will give him a
house on his marriage, that is no valid contract, because it is not
in writing; but if that promise is followed upon the marriage,
by possession, that simple fact, if it be for an hour only, ought,
in my opinion, as being a part performance of the promise, to
take the case out of the statute of frauds, and the party who has
got the contract thus perfected by part performance is in just
as good a situation as if he had a contract in writing by the
father saying that 'in consideration of the marriage' I will give
or settle upon you a house.' "
In Caton v. Caton,30 an English case, the modern statutory
rule was laid down with reference to parol agreements in consideration of marriage. There it was held that marriage was not
such a part performance as would take the contract out of the
statute of frauds.
In another English case 31 the court held that persons are
so likely to be led into such promises inconsiderately, that the
law has wisely required them to be manifested by writing, and
that it is the duty of the court to act in conformity with the
statute, and not to endeavor to escape from it is generally salutary enactments.
When we come to statutory law in America we find the
cases generally following the rule laid down in Caton v.
.Ogden v. Ogden, I Bland 284 (1818);Crane v. Gough, 4 Md. 316
(1853).
23Dygert v. Remerschnider, 32 N. Y. 629 (1865).
Ungley v. Ungley, L. R. 4, Ch. Div. 73 (1876).
1
L.
R. 1, h. App. 437 (1865).

Warden v. Jones, 44 ]Eng. Rep. 916 (1857).
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Cjaton. Here marriage is not considered such part performance
of the oral contract as will take the case out of the statute.
In an Alabama case 32 it was held that verbal agreements,
entered into before marriage, to convey property or to make a
settlement in consideration of the marriage, cannot be enforced.
In an Illinois case 33 it was held that a parol antenuptial
agreement is void under the statute of frauds.
Kentucky does not agree with the part performance doctrine. She is one of the few states to hold that part performance
will not take the case out of the statute.
In an 1854 case the court said that no suit at law or in
equity can be maintained on a verbal antenuptial contract. 34
A new Jersey case 35 agrees with this case.
The fact that a person, during an agreement to marry,
informs his intended wife that he will settle $10,000 on her,
constitutes no inducement to the marriage, and is not binding
36
as an antenuptial contract.
An agreement to marry may be so connected with a promise to make an antenuptial contract that it becomes one indivisible contract in consideration of marriage and comes within the
statute of frauds, but, unless in writing, it is not good.37 In
a Massachusetts case 38 it was held that an oral agreement to
execute an antenuptial contract is within the statute; and that
if an oral agreement to marry is dependent upon such an agreement, and a part of it, no action can be maintained upon it,
thereby making the agreement to marry part and parcel of the
agreement in consideration of marriage. New York 39 holds to
the rule that, where a sum of money was promised plaintiff if
she would marry the defendant, the agreement comes
within the statute of frauds. Where the agreement is that
neither party should have any estate in the property of the
"Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. 400 (1842).
3"Richardson v. Richardson, 148 Ill. 563 (1893).
"Potts v. Merrit, 53 Ky. 326 (1854); Mallory's Admr. v. Mallory's
Acmr., 12 Ky. L. R. 684 (1890).
"Manning v. Riley, 52 N. J. Eq. 39 (1893).
0Chambers v. Sallie, 29 Ark. 407 (1874).
TCaylor
v. Roe, 99 Ind. 1 (1884).
"Aase v. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359 (1882).
31Cushman v. Burritt, 14 Wkly. Dig. 59, 26 Hun. (N. Y.) 39 (1882).
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other, the agreement was held to be within the statute. 40
follows the rule laid down here. 41

Ohio

EFFECT OF ELEMENTS OF FRAUD

We now come to the real question in the part performance
doctrine-an oral agreement plus fraud. Where the cases are
taken out of the statute, as a general rule, fraud appears as the
one big outstanding element. I believe all the cases relating
to the contract in consideration of marriage can be accounted
for on this basis, when they are taken out of the statute. We
can call this actual fraud, or give it some other name, as we
choose; but the fact remains that there is fraud of some kind,
where the case is taken out of the statute. Where the promise
to the woman is made to convey her some property in consideration of marriage, this is a case of actual fraud, when the property is deeded away to another just before the marriage. It has
all the elements of fraud. But where possession has been taken,
under an agreement of this kind and money has been expended,
we might class this as virtual fraud upon the one taking possession and improving with expenditures. In other words, if
the agreement were not carried out, the one performing could
not be put into the same position he was in before, so that he
would not lose. Where the whole has been performed on the
one side, where an action at law is inadequate, it would be a
fraud against the one who has performed not to grant him
specific performance.
The statute of frauds became a law to prevent frauds and
perjuries. If, where fraud exists, specific performance were not
decreed, then the statute of frauds would become an instrument
of fraud. From this standpoint, the law would not be consistent if the fraud were not prevented, even tho the contracts are
in parol.
In an Iowa case 42 it was held that the purpose and intent
of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud, and that the courts
will, so far as possible, refuse to permit it to be made the shield
for fraud. A Massachusetts case 43 says that the cases most
40

Carpenter v. Commings, 4 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1889); Brown v.

Conger, 8 Hun. 625 (1849).

"Finch v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501 (1860); Henry v. Henry, 27 Ohio
St. 121 (1875).
1
42Bader
v. Hiscox, 174 N. W. 565 (1918).
Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 (1869).
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frequently referred to are those arising out of agreements for
marriage settlements. In such cases, the marriage, altho not
regarded as part performance of the agreement for a marriage settlement, is such an irretrievable change of situation
that, if procured by artifice, upoir the faith that the settlement
had been, or the assurance that it would be, executed, the other
party is held good to make the agreement, and not permitted to
defeat it by pleading the statute.
I think this one of the best statements in the cases on
taking these agreements out of the statute. The Massachusetts
idea is supported generally in the United States,44 and is probably nowhere better stated than in the above.
In the case where the intended husband promised the intended wife, as an antenuptial oral agreement, that he would
deed her a house and lot after marriage, and did deed the property, while debts of his were outstanding, it was held to be a
fraud upon the creditors and the deed was set aside.4 5 An
agreement was drawn between the father and the independent
husband of his daughter, to be signed in consideration of the
marriage, but was not signed. The intended husband married
the daughter and sued her father for specific performance of
the contract.4 6 Held, on the basis of fraud, that there should
be specific performance. The actual fraud was in urging on
the marriage and not performing his part as agreed to before
the marriage. Some courts view this as no fraud, since there
was no written contract.
-here the promise contained in an oral antenuptial agreement is made merely in expectation or contemplation of marriage, and there is a consideration for the-contract other than
the marriage of the parties, the promise does not come within
the statute of frauds relative to contracts made in consideration
of marriage. A good many states hold to this view. In a Missouri case 47 it was held that the surrender of a child by his
mother to the clistody and control of a man whom she marries
in pursuance of an oral contract by which, in consideratiohi di
the marriage, and of the services of tie child, tlie husband
"Peek v. Peek, 77 Calif. 106 (1888); Green v. Green, 34 Kan. 740

(1886).

5fanning v. Riley, 52 N. J. Eq. 39 (1893j.
v. Mascall & Gookes, 23 Eng. Rep. 73i (1690).
4'Towack v. Breger, 34 S. W. 489 (1896).
4Gookes
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(intended) agrees to give the child a share of his estate equal
to that which an heir would be entitled to, constitutes an independent, additional, and valuable consideration which will
amount to part performance of the contract and take the case
out of the statute.
In a New York case 48 it was held that an oral agreement
to marry, and pay the then existing debts of the proposed husband, in consideration that he convey to the proposed wife certain premises of which he is the owner, if fully performed by
the wife, is valid and binding in equity upon the husband; and
a conveyance made to her of the premises in pursuance thereof,
is upon good and sufficient consideration.
In a Wisconsin case 49 it was held that defendant's execution of the oral contract by providing for support and comfort
of the wife during her life, and the conveyance of the land by
her to defendant, takes the contract out of the statute. A number of cases uphold or support these in their contention that
outside consideration will take these contracts out of the statute.5" In a Pennsylvania case, .1 wherein it appeared that a
man orally promised to transfer certain lands to his intended
wife, in consideration of the marriage, it was held that, altho the
agreement was void because it was a conveyance of land by parol,
no question could arise on the ground it was made in consideration of marriage, since the English statute had not been adopted
in that state.
In the case of an oral antenuptial agreement by a husband
to make a settlement upon his wife in consideration of the marriage, if the husband after marriage conveys or settles property
on her in pursuance of this prior agreement, she, according
to the better view, is deemed a volunteer, and the settlement is
subject to attack by the husband's creditors to the same extent
as any other voluntary transfer of his property for the benefit
52
,of his wife. This would be a fraud upon the creditors.
Attorney at Law,

H. H. FUSON.

Harlan, Ky.
43

Dygert v. Remerschnider, 32 N. Y. 629 (1865).
Johnson, 47 N. W. 615 (1890).
1' Jordon v. Money, 10 Eng. Rep. 868 (1854); Steen v. Kirkpatricc,
!84 Miss. 63 (1904); Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154 (1856).
'Flory v. Houck, 186 Pa. 263 (1898).
"Floyd v. Fulton, 91 U. S. 363 (1875); Deshon v. Wood, 148 Mass.
4

9Larsen v.

182 (1888).

